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Yesterday’s essay by Ionna Tourkochoriti about recent memory politics in Greece marks
the conclusion of our first online symposium on memory laws, jointly conducted by the
T.M.C. Asser Institute (The Hague) and Verfassungsblog. Twelve scholars from eight
countries have offered their critical perspectives on the legal governance of historical
memory, categorised under the common heading of “memory laws”. One aspect crystalized
by this symposium is that despite their multiple forms (punitive and declarative,
constitutional and administrative, legislative and judicial, etc.), the adoption of such memory
regulations has been on a tremendous rise in Europe. Furthermore, their mushrooming in
Central and Eastern Europe, as vividly demonstrated by several of our authors (Bán,
Belavusau, Gliszczyńska-Grabias, Halmai, Koncewicz, Koposov, Přibáň), has been
intertwined with a certain decline of rule of law in the region. “Illiberal democracies” seem to
be particularly eager to revert to populist identity-formation under the guise of memory
politics, mainstreaming nationalist historiography while marginalizing and, at times,
supressing alternative historical memories of minorities. Likewise, the controversial decision
of the European Court of Human Rights in Perinçek (2015), an impressively voluminous
judgement challenging the prohibition to deny Armenian genocide, has in recent years
sparked an unprecedented attention to invoking law in the context of historical memory.
Evolution of Memory Laws: from “German” Legal Fashion to
Memory Wars
It is nonetheless symbolic that this symposium is run on the German Verfassungsblog,
since Germany has undoubtedly become a trend-maker in the world of comparative law
regarding legal governance of memory and wider Erinnerungspolitik, being the first in
Europe to introduce the crime of Holocaust denial into its Criminal Code in the 1980s. As is
well described in recent literature (in particular, here and here), German criminal practices
have resulted in a spill-over effect for the adoption of penal memory laws elsewhere as well
as for a gradual extension of their scope beyond pure Holocaust denial towards a broader
prohibition of genocide denialism, epitomised by a secondary EU law adopted during then-
German presidency of the Council (2008).
During the 1980s and 1990s, and even partially in the early 2000s, legislative memory
provisions and historical trials in Europe and elsewhere were largely a matter of targeting
revisionist and denialist narratives about Shoah, Armenian genocide, colonial atrocities,
etc., raising painful questions about the past and its lessons for a hopefully more
emancipated and tolerant future. In contrast, from 2000s and especially 2010s onwards, we
can observe a pretty vivid turn in memory laws which are being converted into an
instrument of memory wars, especially in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. Anna
Wójcik has explained how the concept of mnemonic security has been instrumentalised to
advance justifications for memory laws in a number of countries in this region to fortify their
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sovereignty in light of Russian propaganda. The process of legal rehabilitation of Stalinism
along with the white-washing of Soviet expansionism of the epoch is described by Nikolay
Koposov. Putin’s Russia has taken a dangerous rhetoric of stirring up (post-)Soviet
imperialism to cover up military interventions in the region via a peculiar vindication of
communism – ever more contradictory in light of its parallel rehabilitation of the “good tsar”
killed by Bolsheviks and revival of religious Orthodox obscurantism, once successfully
supressed by the same communists.
Why Ukrainian Memory Laws Stand Out as Possibly Only
Justifiable at the Moment?
In this respect, Ukrainian de-communization laws were clearly adopted as an attempt to
counteract Russian media propaganda and military aggression, as is convincingly outlined
by Maria Mälksoo. In this respect, I will certainly agree with Maria, who – unlike more
blatant opponents of Ukrainian memory laws – demonstrates that the “criticism of Ukraine
is implicitly of the Orientalizing and infantilizing kind. The proponents of decommunization
have a point in sorting out Ukraine’s belated Vergangenheitsbewältigung with the Soviet
past.” Nonetheless, Maria suggests that “Ukraine cannot escape the basic dilemma of
‘defending democracy’ whilst tilting the ever-elusive balance between security and liberty”.
Despite me arguing elsewhere against memory laws (e.g. here and here), I will actually
make a paradoxical statement to suggest that Ukrainian de-communization provisions are
at the moment probably the only memory laws that can be justified in light of mnemonic
security. Let’s not forget that Ukraine has to counteract a heavy machinery of Russian
media propaganda, under the dramatic state of annexation and military occupation in
Crimea and Donbass, with monthly casualties on its battlefields. This is precisely the point
that makes 2016 Polish memory law on the Volhynia massacre (while I am not denying the
clearly shameful side of the Ukrainian involvement in this ethnic cleansing of 1943-1944)
absolutely untimely, unneighbourly and even contradicting the logic of mnemonic security,
the major current task of which should be to counteract Putin’s propaganda instead of
shaming weaker neighbours. Likewise, as I argue in my seminal blogpost for this
symposium, the attack on the figures of the early 20th-century Belarusian intelligentsia in
Poland via a memory law is rather of an ill-timed mauvais ton and puts the legal
governance of memory into serious conflict with minority protection.
Memory Laws, Right to Truth and Rule of Law
Polish-Russian battles over historical justice are also at the centre of Grażyna
Baranowska’s analysis of the Katyn affair in Strasbourg. By placing this judgement in the
comparative context of parallel developments in Latin America and Spain, Grażyna
demonstrates how ECtHR’s jurisprudence on this matter is rather a missed opportunity
than convincing reasoning, certainly undermining the “right to truth” in Europe. The matter
of this undermined right to truth has been singled out also with regard to the Spanish
memory law, Ley de Memoria Histórica (52/2007), which marked its 10th anniversary last
year, with rather modest and largely declaratory results regarding right to truth. Gábor
Halmai, Jiří Přibáň and Tomek Koncewicz further unfold how the legal governance in
Hungary, Czechia and Poland respectively centres on a certain fixation on „truth about
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past“, or on what Jiří has eloquently formulated as „neurotic collective memory of
postcomunism“.
The Hungarian case is particularly emblematic for Verfassungsblog because, as Gábor
demonstrates, legal governance of memory has been embedded within Fidesz’s
constitutional reform which is packed with references to history and portrays Hungary as an
innocent victim of the two 20th century totalitarian regimes. Likewise, the Polish obsession
with counteracting the parlance of “Polish concentration camps” and its mainstream
downplaying of anti-Semitic violence towards Jews on behalf of the “virtuous Poles” during
World War II is emblematic of memory laws as central in shaping citizenship populism in
the region.
Memory Laws beyond Pure Symbolism: Towards „Law and
History“
Yet mnemonic paranoia is not always necessarily of a purely symbolic nature for
constitutional identity formation. It can actually have a commercial impact, too. As Marina
Bán demonstrates, “lex Heineken” is pending its possible adoption in Hungary, liable to
affect purely commercial interests via prohibiting the “communist” red star. This leads us to
think about “law and history” as a new self-standing legal discipline, encompassing political,
historical, sociological, linguistic, economic and even artistic facets meritorious of
comparative study. Eric Heinze convincingly argues why the “field of law and historical
memory – which is nothing other than a society’s matrix of discussion on its origins and
values – can come to assume a premier place among the objects of legal analysis”. This
account reads as complimentary to the attempts of taxonomy and chronicle of memory
laws, suggested by Aleksandra Gliszczyńska-Grabias and Nikolay Koposov.
Within the MELA project (“Memory Laws in European and Comparative Perspective”), we
seek to provide policy recommendations for the ethical use of memory provisions and
jurisprudence, and are compiling a database of relevant memory laws and judgements for
future reference and comparative constitutional studies. By no means does this project
follow the objectives national institutes of remembrance – a recent mushrooming
phenomenon in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, and a number of other
countries – seek to achieve. Instead of necessarily popularizing or justifying memory laws
as such, we offer a critical analysis beyond national narratives of truths, also postulated by
these national institutions. The latter essentially mimic each other in their remembrance of
the totalitarian past despite their varying (sometimes mutually contradictory) engineering of
national identities. At times, this academic task requires standing up to state myths that
proclaim “our” nations to always perform as either innocent victims or glorious fighters for
freedom against evil aggressors. In this respect, Ioanna Tourkochoriti’s account of recent
affairs in Greece captures how crucial it could be to rise above the dichotomy of “virtuous
Greeks” and “atrocious Turks”, as no nation is immune from past or future injustices
towards others.
Mnemonic Constitutionalism
Going beyond the theoretical accounts of Aleksandra Gliszczyńska, Eric Heinze and
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Nikolay Koposov, I would further suggest that law and history drive us into the fascinating
area of what I term “mnemonic constitutionalism”. This type of constitutionalism
encompasses, yet transcends pure measures against genocide denialism and declarative
memory laws postulating or commemorating certain historical events. The Hungarian
constitutional project reveals how history can be embedded into the Basic Law but it is not
the only precedent of largely simplistic historical myths being inscribed into constitutional
texts and major statutes. On a more positive side, one could think of the whole
constitutional project of Israel, for example. In the absence of the actual constitution, this
project has been based on the proclamation of the state as an act addressing historical
injustice and finding its constitutional foundation in deep antiquity. Furthermore, the way
citizenship – a central subject of constitutional texts – is distributed in many states is
dependent on historical lineage. For instance, recently Spaniards and Portuguese even
began granting citizenship to the descendants of the Sephardic Jews expelled in the
Medieval period. From the way we teach history in schools to the way we impose national
holidays, street names and monuments, this mnemonic constitutionalism surrounds us from
our childhood and shapes our identities through various legal measures, only a tiny fraction
of which is actually criminal prohibitions. The majority of such regulations amount to the soft
governance of memory. This area of mnemonic constitutionalism, therefore, undoubtedly
leaves plenty more food for thought and fascinating legal enigmas for further research and
critical exploration.
…Last but Not Least: Remerciements
Concluding this debate on Verfassungsblog, let me in the first place express warm
gratitude to all the authors who joined this online symposium after my seminal blogpost
here, with their splendid essays written over Christmas holidays! I am equally very grateful
to my T.M.C. Asser Institute’s colleagues in The Hague, Aylin Gayibli, Faten Busheri and
Ruud Stevens, for all their precious assistance during the last two weeks. Last but not least,
thanks to Max Steinbeis, the founder and the tireless editor of Verfassungsblog who made
this symposium possible, for his interest, support and prudent reading! This was the first
jointly organized project between T.M.C. Asser Institute and Verfassungsblog. I hope many
others will follow soon.
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